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Abstract!
This thesis examines theories of pain in the eighteenth century, and what it 
meant to sympathize with the pain of another. I begin briefly with the theories of 
Descartes and his adherents before focusing on David Hartley and John Locke. 
Physicians and natural philosophers of the period understood pain as a pure 
mechanism of the nervous system, confined to the tubelike fibers that run 
through the body. Naturally everyone feels pain by some means, whether illness 
or injury, so men ought to be able to sympathize with the afflictions of others. 
Yet, according to Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, this is not so. He 
argues for the ultimate inexpressibility of pain; our nerves do not mimic the 
activity of another’s nerves, and our reality cannot completely intersect with the 
reality of another. Working from the theory that sympathy is a shared suffering, 
pain then becomes impossible to share. Therefore, physical afflictions cannot 
receive others’ sympathies in the same manner as those of the passions, which 
pass easily between minds. !
! While the physicians separated the painful operations of the body from 
the passions and from mind, newly popular sentimental fiction attempted to 
reunite all three in their work as their authors strove to replicate realistic 
"v
!
experiences, expressly fictional or otherwise. Bodily pain and emotional suffering 
lie on either end of a dialectic, and I propose that the fulcrum sits at inventive 
semantics that rely on a consciously-created mediator. To demonstrate this, I use 
the example of Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa: or, History of a Young Lady. 
Richardson assiduously disallows his characters to express real physical pain 
directly, but frequently uses every linguistic variation of the word “pain” to 
emphasize emotional and motivational distress rather than bodily harm. Clarissa 
in particular refuses to say that she experiences any discomfort even when the 
situation suggests she ought, emphasizing the unimportance of physical 
substance to her being. Although Richardson’s characters undergo all sorts of 
pains, physical and cognitive, noun and verb, the only ones directly accessible to 
the reader are the pains of the mind; all that is known of the body comes 
mediated several times over by the epistles, semantics, and Richardson 
himself. This essay suggests how novelists incorporate and accommodate these 
anatomical theories and their relation to the passions rather than repudiate them 
for the sake of a fabricated subjectivity.!
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Introduction!
! What was pain in the eighteenth century, and what was it to sympathize 
with that of another? I will begin briefly with the speculations of Descartes and 
his adherents, Boerhaave, and other early theorists before focusing on David 
Hartley and John Locke. Physicians and natural philosophers of the period 
understood pain as a pure mechanism of the nervous system, confined to the 
tubelike fibers that run through the body. Naturally everyone feels pain by some 
means, whether illness, injury, or natural defect, so men ought to be able to 
sympathize with the afflictions of others. Yet, according to Adam Smith in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, this is not so. He argues for the ultimate 
inexpressibility of pain; our nerves do not mimic the activity of another’s nerves, 
and our reality cannot completely intersect with the reality of another. !
Elaine Scarry examines in depth this particular problem in her 
monograph, The Body in Pain. She claims that: “When one hears about another 
person’s physical pain, the events happening within the interior of that person’s 
body may seem to have the remote character of some subterranean fact, 
belonging to an invisible geography that, however portentous, has no reality 
"1
!
because it has not yet manifested on the visible surface of the earth.”  Even 1
though the sufferer feels their own pain however intensely, they may sit 
naturally next to another person, and that other person would never know the 
sufferer’s pain exists: !
…while for the person outside the sufferer’s body, what is 
“effortless” is not grasping it (it is easy to remain wholly unaware 
of its existence; even with effort, one may remain in doubt about its 
existence or may retain the astonishing freedom of denying its 
existence; and finally, if with the best effort of sustained attention 
one successfully apprehends it, the aversiveness of the “it” one 
apprehends will only be a shadowy fraction of the actual “it”.)
…  Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through its 
unsharability, and it ensures this unsharability through its 
resistance to language.  !2
Pain may be communicated through inarticulate cries and gestures or by analogy 
but never directly, and therefore none can understand precisely the 
discomforting sensations of another. Scarry explains, “…for physical pain—
unlike any other state of consciousness—has no referential content. It is not of or 
for anything. It is precisely because it takes no object that it, more than any other 
"2
 Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 3. 1
 Ibid, 4. 2
!
phenomenon, resists objectification to language.”  Erin Goss supports this 3
assertion in Revealing Bodies when she explains that “the body can only be an 
allegorical figure… [and] the body exceeds that figure in its insistent materiality, 
and the body’s experience cannot be contained by the figure by which it achieves 
its conceptualization.”  Not only can another barely understand another’s pain, 4
but even the body itself cannot fully realize its own experiences. These 
experiences inevitably spill over into the unknown: !
The living body, however, is among other things a body that feels 
pain, and that pain attests to both the living body’s life and to the 
incommensurability of its experiences with those of others… Pain 
removes from the subject the ability to imagine one’s own body as 
comprehensible and representable, stripping the ability to name 
bodily experience at the same time that such experience demands 
expression in order to be verified. Pain removes the capacity for 
generality required for the body’s representation—even to 
oneself… [pain] reveals the necessity of metaphor to describe 
bodily experience. (41)!
"3
 Ibid, 5. 3
 Goss, Erin M. Revealing Bodies: Anatomy, Allegory, and the Grounds of Knowledge in the Long 4
Eighteenth Century. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2012. 8. 
!
Working with the idea put forth by Adam Smith that sympathy is a shared 
suffering, if physical pain is impossible to share, it becomes nearly impossible to 
sympathize with. Therefore, physical afflictions cannot receive others’ 
sympathies in the same manner as those of the passions, which pass easily 
between minds. Pain elucidates the eighteenth century understanding of the 
separation of—or connection between—the mind and the body.!
While the physicians separated the painful operations of the body from 
the passions and from mind, newly popular sentimental fiction attempted to 
reunite all three in their work as their authors strove to replicate realistic 
experiences, expressly fictional or otherwise. Bodily pain and emotional suffering 
lie on either end of a dialectic, and I propose that the fulcrum sits at inventive 
semantics that rely on a consciously-created mediator. To demonstrate this, I use 
the example of Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa: or, History of a Young Lady. 
Richardson assiduously avoids the explicit expression of physical pain from his 
main characters, but rather uses every linguistic variation of the word “pain” to 
emphasize emotional and motivational distress rather than bodily harm. "Pain" 
can function as a noun, denoting a sensation, or a verb, indicating a strenuous 
effort. For example, Mrs. Harlowe may complain of the pain in her heart from the 
pains she has taken to marry her daughter Clarissa to Mr. Solmes. Clarissa 
herself in particular refuses to say that she experiences any discomfort even 
"4
!
when the situation suggests that she ought, emphasizing the peripheral quality 
of physical form. Although Richardson’s primary characters undergo all sorts of 
pains, physical and cognitive, noun and verb, the only ones directly accessible to 
the reader are the pains of the mind; all that is known of the body comes 
mediated several times over by the epistles, semantics, and Richardson himself. !
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to the continuing work on the 
eighteenth century perspectives on neuroscience and the mechanisms of 
cognition by looking at the bodily experience of pain as a means to understand 
the accessibility—or inaccessibility—of mind. Furthermore, this thesis suggests 
how novelists incorporate and accommodate these anatomical theories and their 
relation to the passions rather than repudiate them for the sake of subjectivity 
using Richardson’s Clarissa as a test case.. In an era beginning to look inward, 
physically and metaphorically, how could a novelist portray introspection 
without contending with the mechanisms that lie beneath his own skin?!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!
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 Chapter I: The Confinement of Pain!
According to eighteenth century anatomical theory, physical pain is 
confined—confined to the nerves, confined to the body, confined to 
inexpressibility and therefore excluded from reality. For centuries, those who 
have studied the human body agree that when the body receives an injury, the 
nerves of the body play an exclusive role in conducting pain. Many eighteenth 
century physicians had their own theories on the precise mechanism of the 
nerves, but all located that mechanism in the nerve fibers. Other theorists—
philosophical and contemporary—have picked up on that isolation and 
extrapolated further that pain, in its confinement to the nerve fibers, is also 
confined to the person who experiences it. This section of the essay will explore 
the eighteenth century theories and the philosophies that arose from or accord 
with their conclusions. !
Theories of the nervous system in the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
primarily understood the body either as a mechanistic system or an animistic 
one. Either it was a machine that acts according to its particular protocols, or it 
was an agent of the consciousness. Herman Boerhaave, a Dutch botanist famous 
for first observing the esophageal tearing that results from vigorous vomiting, 
"6
!
regarded the body as a “complex hydraulic system regulated by a series of fluid 
dynamics in the vasculature and nervous systems. Health was due to the correct 
flow of these fluids; disease by their stoppage or interference.”  Obviously vomit, 5
the improper travel of fluids, indicates sickness. But improper fluid travel within 
the nerves also resulted in maladies of various kinds, including physical pain. 
Georg-Ernst Stahl, a German physician, disagreed with this mechanistic view of 
the anatomy, advocating instead the theory of animism. Animism dictates that 
the soul is the principium vitae, the originator of physiological functions as well as 
consciousness. Swiss doctor Albrecht von Haller represents the third perspective: 
he proposed that the nerves possess a certain sensibility that muscles, which 
simply contract, do not have. As Roy Porter explains, Haller “differentiated 
organ structures according to their fibre composition, ascribing them to intrinsic 
sensitivities independent of any transcendental… soul.”  From this perspective, 6
the body is neither reliant upon the soul for direction nor upon precise and rigid 
rules for operation but on its organic (rather than mechanical) composition. 
Theories on the production of pain from the nervous system, however, were far 
more complicated than mechanistic vs. organic vs. animistic. !
"7
 Rocca, Julius. “William Cullen (1710-1790) and Robert Whytt (1714-1766) on the Nervous 5
System.” Brain, Mind, and Medicine: Essays in Eighteenth Century Neuroscience. Ed. Harry Whitaker, 
C.U.M. Smith, and Stanley Finger. New York: Springer, 2007. 85. 
 Porter, Roy. “Medical Science.” The Cambridge Illustrated History of Medicine. Ed. Roy Porter. 6
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 165. 
!
The Cartesian paradigm on pain, originally articulated by Descartes in his 
Treatise on Man and picked up by his successors—John Hunter, Albrecht von 
Haller, and Charles Bonnet— held that the nerves extend from every extremity to 
the spinal column, through which they connect to the brain and thus influence 
the senses. !
!
Figure 1.1: A stimulus (fire) 
upon the nerves of the human 
body !7!
Their theories differ only on the mode of travel. For Descartes, the animal spirits 
of the blood break the nerves as they move along, but when this movement 
"8
 Descartes, René. De Homine Figuris et Latintate Donatus a Florentio Schuyl. Trans. Florentio Schuyl. 7
Lyons: Petrum, Leffen, & Franciscum Myardum, 1662, 33. 
!
becomes too vigorous, they break and “cause a movement in the brain which 
gives occasion for the soul… to have the sensation of pain.”  In the late 8
eighteenth century, Scottish physician John Hunter proposed the same structure 
for the nervous system (nerves connect to the spine and then to the brain), but 
rather than suggesting that the nerves break, Hunter’s theory holds that they 
compress and expand like coils and that nothing of substance travels along the 
nerves, i.e. no animal spirits. He explains, “Nothing material is conveyed from 
the brain by the nerves, nor vice versa from the body to the brain; for if that was 
exactly the case, it would not be necessary for the nerves to be of the same 
materials as the brain; but as we find…[they are]… it is presumptive proof that 
they only continue the same action which they receive at either end.” 
Furthermore, “any sensory stimulation carried to excess could result in pain and 
when a large nerve is compressed the most acute sensation (pain or numbness) 
will be at some distance below the compression.”  Therefore, significantly 9
compressing this coil or pulling it to its full length will hurt, but leaving it 
around its natural tension does not. The alteration to the nerve at one end will be 
reciprocated precisely in the brain. Swiss philosopher Charles Bonnet suggested 
a similar non-material transmission of nerve signals when he concluded that 
"9
 Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Trans, John Cottingham, Robert 8
Stoothoof, Dugald Murdoch. Vol 1. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 103. 
 Hunter, John. The Works of John Hunter. Pub posth, Rees Longman: London, 1837, 89, 263. 9
!
“pleasure and pain are themselves caused by the ‘vibrations’ of the fibers: the 
pleasurableness or painfulness of sensations depends on the degree of these 
vibrations and on the relative mobility of the molecules of which the fibers 
consist.”  For example, one nerve might not have adequate room to vibrate in 10
proportion to the sensation that it must transmit, and the amplitude of that 
vibration combined with the insufficient space to accommodate it translates to 
the brain as pain. In both Descartes’ and Bonnet’s theories, impinging on the 
nerve’s territory, either by pressing on the nerve itself or the nerve banging 
against the sides of its enclosure, causes pain. !
In 1786, Haller proposed something very unique for neurology at the time: 
the nerves are made of a soft pulp rather than a tensile but solid material. 
Therefore, “the nervous fibers cannot possibly tremulate in an elastic manner.”  11
This is to say that the nerves themselves do not deviate and then return to an 
original shape, snapping back to their neutral state like a rubber band. A pulp-
like material does not desire to return to its natural shape after having been 
altered in some way; it is malleable, impressionable, and infinitely formable. So, 
rather than the nerves themselves transmitting signals through their oscillations, 
a fluid within the nerves transmits the signals as it moves from one locale to 
"10
 Bonnet, Charles. Essai analytique sur les facultés de l’âme. Copenhagen: Freres CH. & Ant. 10
Philibert, 118, 120-122. 
 Ibid, 220. 11
!
another—from a fingertip to the brain, for example—stimulated either by the 
heart’s pumping or the brain’s detection of stimuli. The nerve itself is simply a 
conduit rather than a means for sensation. Implicit here is the assumption that 
the human body is not as fixed in its composition as other physicians would 
believe but rather is as inconstant in their physiology as in their minds. Haller 
sharply differentiated between sensibility, the ability to feel, and irritability, the 
ability to move. Irritability is the province of the nerves while sensibility—
sensation in this context—is the province of the soul/mind. Anne Vila sees this 
inconsistency as a tension between two theoretical concerns of Haller’s: “As a 
physiologist, Haller sought to elucidate the vital forces that inhered in the body 
itself. Yet as a natural philosopher with a conservative religious bent, he also 
sought to preserve some degree of independence for the soul, which he insisted 
should be seen as an immaterial entity that communicates with the body through 
the nerves.”  Indeed so: Haller allowed for the connection between the mind 12
and the body, but more important  in his physiological theories is the inconstancy 
of the body itself in the proposed malleable and tubular nerve fibers. !
Meanwhile, David Hartley devised the most intricate theory of pain and 
physicality articulated at the time in his Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, 
and His Expectations that implies a similar inconstancy as Haller: pain results from 
"11
 Vila, Anne C. Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth-12
Century France. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 16. 
!
the vibrations of the particles housed within nerve fibers. His doctrine of vibration, 
as he named it, stipulates that “external objects impressed upon the Senses 
occasion, first in the Nerves on which they are impressed, and then in the Brain, 
Vibrations of the small, and, as one may say, infinitesimal medullary Particles.”  13
Although both suggest that the nerve itself acts as a conduit for something else, 
be it fluid or particle, for Haller the nerves simply conduct sensations rather than 
produce them. Meanwhile, Hartley’s vibrations do not result from a simple touch 
of an object—as Hunter, Bonnet, and Haller suggested. In Hartley’s words, “we 
are to conceive, that when external Objects are impressed on the sensory Nerves, 
they excite Vibrations in the Aether residing in the Pores of these Nerves, by 
means of the mutual Actions interceding between the Objects, Nerves, and 
Aether.”  The aether was a hypothetical medium that pushes downward toward 14
the earth and then is pushed back upward again, allowing for gravity and other 
movement. Hartley believed that the aether flowed through tiny holes in the 
nerve fibers to interact with the object pressing upon the nerve, causing the 
particles inside to vibrate. Since the nerves and the brain are of the same 
material, the vibrations inside the peripheral nerves will cause the correlating 
particles in the medullary nerves to vibrate at the same frequency: “the 
"12
 Hartley, David. Observations on Man, his Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations. Vol. 1. New York: 13
Garland Publishing, 1749/1971, 11.
 Ibid, 21. 14
!
Vibrations thus excited in the Aether and Particles of the sensory Nerves, will be 
propagated along the Course of these Nerves up to the Brain.”  Again, the 15
sensation impressed upon the nerves cannot register without first passing 
through the aether. Only then can particle vibrations then complete their motions 
in the brain, which registers the discomfort. This theory improves upon that of 
Haller inasmuch as Haller’s nervous liquid requires time, even if only a second, 
to travel the length of the body to stimulate the brain. Meanwhile Hartley’s 
aether allows for instantaneous physical and cerebral communication, thus 
allowing for a connection between (though not the homogeneity of) the body and 
the mind. !
The most significant aspect of Hartley’s theory is the intercession of the 
aether on the nervous fibers. According to his theory, humans cannot even 
experience their own sensations without an intermediary. Since the particles 
must pass through the aether before reaching the nerve to cause any sensation 
whatever, direct physical contact between man and the world around him is then 
logically prohibited; the aether is always in the way. Therefore, man is physically 
isolated, and his pain cannot extend beyond his own frame. Even man’s passions
—his “intellectual pain,” e.g. grief or heartache, extend from sensory pain: “Now 
it will be sufficient proof, that in all the intellectual pleasures and pains are 
"13
 Ibid, 21-2215
!
deducible ultimately from the sensible ones...for thus none of the intellectual 
pleasures and pains can be original.”  If something so basic requires mediation, 16
is it possible to experience complex emotions without it? For eighteenth century 
people with any medical familiarity, the answer is no. Humans are mediated and 
mediating creatures. !
John Locke most clearly connects the operations of the mind to the 
sensations of the body when he, too, places pain and pleasure along the same 
spectrum in his An Essay on Human Understanding. “By Pleasure and Pain,” he 
says, “I must be understood to mean of Body and Mind, as they are commonly 
distinguished; though in truth, they be only different Constitutions in the Mind, 
sometimes occasioned by disorder in the Body, sometimes by Thoughts in the 
Mind.” First, he observes that both the mind and the body are involved in this 
process—pain may exist in the mind, though this pain is different in kind (mental 
as opposed to physical) rather than degree. The pain of the mind corresponds to 
Hartley’s intellectual pain, sometimes called emotional or psychological pain 
since it does not involve the nerves but the mind and soul. Second, he concedes 
that physical pain can only be known by the experience of the senses, not the 
imagination or reason: “These like other simple Ideas cannot be described, nor 
their Names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple Ideas of the 
"14
 Hartley, 430. 16
!
Senses, only by Experience.”  Thomas Hobbes suggested this very idea, 17
although in less detail, forty years earlier in his Leviathan. He explains, “The 
Original [Object] of them all, is that which we call Sense,” and from the senses 
arise our “endeavors” toward or away from an object. In his words, “That which 
men Desire, they are also sayd to Love: and to Hate those things, for which they 
have Aversion,” with one of these aversions being to the sensation of pain.  18
Physical pain can only exist through sensations, i.e. the experience of the body, 
and cannot be moralized or rationalized without extending it beyond its status as 
a simple idea into a complex idea—simple ideas combined or related by the 
mind. At this point pain would no longer be pain but rather a reflection upon 
pain. Representations of pain encounter this problem as well: once pain escapes 
the realm of experience into that of expression, the representation becomes a one 
of the effects of pain rather than one of pain itself. !
However, more complex ideas may be imprinted upon the mind from an 
external source, thus allowing for reflections upon anything from sadness to 
sympathy. As a simple idea is “only to be got by those impressions Objects 
themselves make on our Minds, by the proper Inlets appointed to each sort,” 
complex ideas “[consist] of several simple ones.” We experience complex ideas 
by “the power of Words, standing for the several Ideas, that make that 
"15
 Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, 229. 17
 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 13, 38. 18
!
Composition.”  Yet, not every single idea may be conveyed to us through 19
language; we need to have been exposed to each simple idea that makes up the 
complex one before the complex idea or the word that represents it can make 
sense. Locke explains:!
In such Collections of Ideas, passing under one name, Definitions, 
or the teaching the signification of the word, by several others, has 
place, and may make us understand the Names of Things, which 
never came within reach of our Senses; and frame Ideas suitable to 
those in other Men’s Minds, when they use those Names: provided 
that none of the terms of the Definition stand for any such simple 
Ideas, which he to whom the Explication is made has never yet had 
in his Thoughts. !20
Locke provides the example of a blind man to explain how this works: a blind 
man can get the idea of a statue, as he himself has the idea of a figure/body, but 
he cannot understand the idea of a picture, never having been exposed to colors. 
In the same way, a deaf woman could understand rhythm through the idea of 
vibration, which she can feel, but not that of a symphony, never having been 
exposed to the sound of a violin or a trombone. Simply, “We can have 
"16
 Locke, 424-25. 19
 Ibid, 426-26. 20
!
Knowledge no farther than we have Ideas.”  Our knowledge is confined to our 21
own experience of the world in the Lockean perspective, and the knowledge 
(although not the mechanisms) of pain remains an innately personal and sensual 
experience; it never matches reality. Our reflections upon our ideas, then, must be 
mediated both through that specific experience of them and through the 
language used to describe them. This is done by what Locke describes as 
juxtaposition or an immediate comparison, i.e. analogy. !
! According to Locke, reflections can be expressed through analogy while 
sensations cannot, and physical pain can only be a sensation; it cannot be shared. 
Any analogy employed must necessarily correspond to a contemplation of the 
experience rather than the experience itself in his view.  Theories of sensation 22
and consequently pain were central to the epistemological and anatomical 
sciences; physicians needed to explain how our minds could register the motions 
and encounters of the body. While their neurological principles connected us to 
the world through constantly mobile particles—or in some cases, fluids or spirits
—that travel back and forth from the brain as a result of external impetus, those 
principles also came to mark our alienation from that world. The mind can only 
"17
 Ibid, 538. 21
 Scarry appears to disagree with this point when she employs analogies to describe pain, but 22
such moments she uses to expose pain’s resistance to language and the necessity of metaphor 
when speaking of it. However, it should be noted that both Locke and Scarry are referring to the 
instant when pain is registered in the brain and not the subsequent moments—the reflection, the 
residual emotions, the consequences, and another nuances that complicate the experience. A 
discussion of such nuances expands beyond the scope and capacity of this thesis. 
!
reflect on the experiences of the body, as Locke insists, because it is of a different 
substance and thus has different capabilities. The mind can make a choice to act, 
which in turn affects the body, certainly. However, the mind largely remains a 
distinct entity in this period. As Jonathan Kramnick explains in his Actions and 
Objects from Hobbes to Richardson, “the distinguishing feature of minds is the 
causal role they do or do not play in physical movement... at the heart of the 
problem of mental causation is the distinction, if there is one, between mind and 
matter.”  The mind influences matter only as an agent, not as a compeer: “the 23
emphasis fell on causation as the means by which mental states or properties 
have at once a real existence and are looped into other things.”  Kramnick 24
explores the tension between the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter 
and the externalist perspective, where mental actions depend upon the external 
world. He also recognizes a slipperiness in Locke, where Locke occasionally 
elides consciousness with the body as though it is something the body possesses, 
a characteristic: “For some writers, including Locke on occasion, consciousness 
was something that bodies have and do. It was not a separate substance put into 
them.” Yet, this perspective is problematic: “But how can a physical system be 
the locus of experience? Matter seems by definition to be without experience, yet 
"18
 Kramnick, Jonathan. Actions and Objects from Hobbes to Richardson. Stanford: Stanford University 23
Press, 2010. 2-3, 8. 
 Ibid, 7. 24
!
put together in certain ways, it gives rise to sentience, awareness, pleasure, pain, 
appetites, and the like.”  Thus, the most common  and most easily understood 25
perspective of the time dictated that the mind/consciousness and the body be 
separate though co-existing entities with the mind having a definite yet limited 
influence on matter. As far as most eighteenth century physicians were 
concerned, the only access the mind has to the body it inhabits and the world it 
observes is its capacity to imagine, conceive, and re-conceive sensory input.      !26
!
!
!
!
!
!
"19
 Ibid, 10. 25
 The theory of functionalism describes this perspective on the mind-body connection. According 26
to Jaegwon Kim in Mind in a Physical World; An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental 
Causation, “functionalism suggests that “mental kinds and properties are functional kinds at a 
higher level of abstraction than physiochemical or biological kinds… its central doctrine seemed 
to postulate a distinctive domain of mental/cognitive properties that could be scientifically 
investigated independently of their physical/biological implementations.” (3) This is not to say 
that functionalism severs the connection but rather creates a hierarchy where “the mental 
‘supervenes’ on the physical” (9). This is not too far off from what Descartes imagined in what 
Kim dubs “Cartesian substance dualism,” where “the world [consists] of two different domains, 
the mental and the material, each with its own distinctive defining properties… There are causal 
interactions across the domains, but entities in each domain, being ‘substances,’ are ontologically 
independent of those of the other, and its metaphysically possible for one domain to exist in the 
total absence of the other” (15). Functionalism, however, side-steps the strict severance between 
the mental and the physical that Cartesian substance dualism relies upon, allowing for a less 
dichotomized perspective. 
!
!
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Chapter II: The Possibilities of Sympathy!
Sympathy as theorized by Adam Smith is something that can be shared; 
with regard to emotions, sympathy is the psychological congruity between the 
one who feels and the one who observes because the one who feels can express 
precisely what he feels. Since pain cannot be expressed precisely and its 
mechanisms cannot extend beyond the body to which it is confined, another can 
only sympathize by means of reflection and analogy and thus logically cannot 
measure up to the congruity required of sympathy. However, sympathy 
previously referred to the correlation between organ disorders within a single 
body. This section will examine the various types of sympathy as they might be 
known in eighteenth century Britain, first as it was a medical concept and next as 
it developed into a primarily psychological and thus subjective phenomenon as 
articulated by Adam Smith in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments. More 
importantly, this section explains sympathy’s role in the moral status of pain: 
sympathy cannot penetrate the physical body and therefore pain cannot be its 
object. !
Like pain, sympathy has a vexed history in the eighteenth century; it 
operates under two definitions that offer conflicting stories, especially as applied 
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to pain. The first definition, far more useful to the physicians of the time, notes 
sympathy as “a relation between two bodily organs or parts such that disorder, 
or any condition, of the one induces a corresponding condition in the other.”  In 27
this construction, sympathy immutably ties together two bodily objects. For 
example, in Nicolas Culpepper’s translation of Thomas Bartholin’s Bartholinus 
Anatomy (1668) he explains the problem of anatomical sympathy: “The Sympathy 
between the Kidneys and the Stomach, as when persons diseased in their 
Kidneys, are troubled with Stomach-sickness and vomiting.”  Such a connection 28
is indubitable and irreversible, giving those who are ill an especially difficult 
time. Sympathy did not begin as psychological congruity between two people; it 
was not sharing in the suffering or happiness of other. Instead, sympathy meant 
the congruity between organ functions.!
Hunter and other physicians, however, were slowly repudiating the 
medical principle of sympathy—rejecting the seemingly magical relationship 
between body parts—and replacing it with more complex theories of how the 
nerves relay pain from one site to another and how the brain interprets those 
signals. For example, in 1751 Robert Whytt, a Scottish physician of the eighteenth 
century, fully accepted the principle of sympathy when he suggested that nerves 
only communicate at the brain/spinal cord and “that possibly this 
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communication accounted for the sympathy between the various parts of the 
body”  and “hypothesized nerve-mediated links between uterus, stomach, and 29
brain.” He arrived at this conclusion through testing reflexes, concluding that the 
spine was absolutely critical in stimulating reflex actions. If the spinal nerves 
were destroyed, nerve communication traveled no further than the site of 
severance. Consequently sympathy, like pain, has multiple meanings that shift 
between physiological and psychological, with the pain favoring the former and 
sympathy favoring the latter. Hunter, for example, did not believe in medical 
sympathy as Whytt described it, stating that: “I believe it is a delusion in the 
mind… a delusion in the mind is an object appearing to be where it is not.”  30
According to Hunter, a stomach ulcer cannot directly cause a throbbing toe or 
anything of the sort; a throbbing sensation likely indicated a problem with the 
toe than the stomach. He suggested instead a theory of referred pain where “the 
brain splits part of the action of sensation in the brain,”  thus deflecting part of 31
the pain to another location, splitting the impulse from the nerves as they arrive. 
Since two different nerves A and B may communicate with each other, the pain of 
nerve A may be communicated to nerve B, but the brain “is aware of it” and so is 
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involved. Hunter explains, “It is very remarkable that none of the sympathies can 
or ever are reversed, therefore they do not arise from communication of the 
nerves but [more likely] from the effect of the brain upon the nerves.”  Namely, 32
the brain itself transfers a pain from one location to the other rather than the 
afflicted part enacting the transference, as Whytt believed, and this transference 
is ubiquitously unidirectional and thus not truly “sympathetic.” The theory of 
medical sympathy slowly lost its relevance as Hunter and other physicians began 
refuting it, delegated to dusty library shelves instead of eighteenth century 
medical practice. !
Contemporaneously, another definition of sympathy began to dominate 
the linguistic landscape of the eighteenth century, one which did not refer to 
direct affinities between tangible objects like kidneys and livers but rather to 
affinities between emotions. As John Brewer explains, “Sentiment and sensibility 
were technical terms employed in medicine, philosophy, and psychology, but 
from the mid-eighteenth century they were widely and loosely used to describe 
the expression of heightened, intense human feelings, a new sort of 
refinement.”  Sympathy became a thing of the mind rather than the body, and, 33
according to Adam Smith, the basis of morality and social conduct. This sort of 
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sympathy is a psychological congruity, “the quality or state of being affected by 
the condition of another with a feeling similar or corresponding to that of the 
other; the fact or capacity of entering into or sharing the feelings of another or 
others; fellow-feeling. Also, a feeling or frame of mind evoked by and responsive 
to some external influence.”  Again, “sympathy” speaks of an affinity or 34
transfer, but not one that can be traced through the nerves or exact 
correspondences.  The relevant emotion does not transfer directly, like a letter 35
carried from one person to another, but rather like that letter translated from one 
language to another. The translation may be extremely close, but it can never 
quite carry the same nuances as the original language: “The person… neither 
feels for someone else… nor deliberately engineers sympathetic feeling, but 
rather converts the idea of another’s feeling into the present and immediate 
impression of that idea… the exchange cannot be perfectly symmetrical.”  The 36
eighteenth century philosophers and authors who theorized sympathy also 
thought of it in these terms. Importantly, sympathy was not limited to suffering; 
it extended to joy, hope, anger, sorrow, fear, and any of the other passions, 
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through it could not pass between individuals with the same vivacity. It carried 
an “epistemological uncertainty” with it, the insurmountable gap between 
minds.  !37
Adam Smith constructs sympathy as the imaginative response within 
ourselves to the tangible passions in another, and propriety consists of the 
parallel between what one expresses and the extent to which the other can 
sympathize. In order to sympathize with another’s passion, however, we must be 
able to put ourselves in the other’s shoes, as it were: “we can form no idea in the 
manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should 
feel in the like situation… [our senses] never did, and never can, carry us beyond 
our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any 
conception of what are his sensations.”  Sympathy does not require an exact 38
parallel between the passions felt by both parties but simply a correlation.  39
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However, Smith admits that “there are some passions of which the expressions 
excite no sort of sympathy, but before we are acquainted with what gave 
occasion to them, serve rather to disgust and provoke us against them.” 
Therefore, our imaginations require “the situation which excites” the passion 
order to replicate it. Yet, as Smith points out frequently, “our sympathy… is 
always extremely imperfect.” Imagination and reality are not the same; the 
sufferer’s passion and the observer’s sympathy are not the same: “Every man 
feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other 
people. The former are the original sensations; the latter the reflected or 
sympathetic images of those sensations. The former may be said to be the 
substance; the latter the shadow” (Smith 3-4).  Sympathy relies on the presence of 
a spectator, someone who observes the suffering in question and thus can reflect 
those sufferings. The sufferer must match his visible lamentation to the level of 
sympathy that an observer can muster out of courtesy, and this forms the basis of 
the Smith’s moral theory.!
Magnanimity, then, is the exact agreement between the passion expressed 
by one and the sympathy felt by the other. The magnanimous man, Smith’s 
equivalent of Aristotle’s virtuous man, is he who allows for “the most perfect 
correspondence between his sentiments and ours, and on that account the most 
perfect propriety in his behavior” (38-39). However, there is not always an 
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observer against which to measure our sentiments, and Smith proposes the idea 
of the internal impartial spectator as a solution. First, he asserts that “our first 
moral criticisms are exercised upon the characters and conduct of other people; 
and we are all very forward to observe how each of these affects us…we begin, 
upon this account, to examine our passions and conduct, and to consider how 
these must appear to [others], by considering how they would appear to us if in 
their situation.” He is both the examiner and the judge. For Smith, virtue is not 
good in itself but good because “it excites those sentiments in other men” (95-96). 
Thus we ought to aspire to become the magnanimous man by means of the 
impartial spectator formulated in our heads. Yet, certain sentiments are easier for 
another to sympathize with than others. !
! According to Smith, physical pain is one such difficult sentiment; another 
person cannot sympathize with our wounds, illnesses, or dying convulsions. He 
claims, “Pain never calls forth any very lively sympathy unless it is accompanied 
with danger. We sympathize with the fear, though not with the agony of the 
sufferer.” The only sympathy we can muster when observing someone else’s 
physical pain is a sympathy with the fear they might feel for the inflicter of the 
pain. We can replicate the fear of the sword but not the sensation of its cut. Why 
is this the case? Smith asserts that “nothing is so soon forgot as pain. The 
moment it is gone the whole agony of it is over, and the thought of it can no 
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longer give us any sort of disturbance. We ourselves cannot then enter into the 
anxiety and anguish which we had before conceived” (21). Smith also suggests 
that “our imaginations can more readily mould themselves upon his 
imagination, than our bodies can mould themselves upon his body,” so part of 
the problem is that our body cannot imitate a broken pelvis or the gout in 
another in the same way that our mind can mimic despair. Furthermore, for the 
one in pain, he is not truly feeling the suffering in that instant, according to 
Smith: “When we are under the greatest bodily pain… we shall always find, if 
we attend to it, that it is not the suffering of the present instant which chiefly 
torments us, but either the agonizing remembrance of the past, or the yet more 
horrible dread of the future. The pain of each instant, considered by itself, and 
cut off from all that goes before and all that comes after it, is a trifle, not worth 
regarding” (261). Consequently, the sufferer ought not express his pain lest he 
foolishly attempt the impossible. Rather, he ought to recognize the 
insurmountable gap between minds and accept the mediation allotted him. !
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter III: Clarissa: Pain and Sympathy Mediated!
Both Clarissa Harlowe and her creator, Samuel Richardson, knew well the 
agony of pain and dying. Both suffered from, as Raymond Stephanson suggests, 
a “nervous sensibility, or that intimate relationship of mind and body (the nexus 
is the nerves) in which one’s mental state can have a direct effect on one’s bodily 
health (or vice versa).”  Dr. George Cheyne, a close friend of Richardson’s for 40
years, diagnoses his symptoms as “merely nervous,” informing him that “If you 
would honestly have my Opinions about the Cause and Origin of your Disorder 
I take it you were born originally of weak Nerves… then the Nerves have been 
wasted and relaxed by your sedentary Life and thinking attentively.”  He and 41
Clarissa suffer from remarkably similar illnesses, illnesses originating in the very 
anatomical structures that dictate sensation and pain. For Richardson, he was 
incredibly depressed and paranoid for the final years of his life and suffered from 
tremors and insomnia, the melancholy and weak nerves that Cheyne warned 
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him about.  He would complain of an “increased Malady in the Nervous Way.”  42 43
When he describes his illness as “nervous,” he does not mean an ailment of 
anxiety but rather one of the nerves themselves, though he cannot specify exactly 
what feels wrong. As his biography explains, “for many years before his death, 
his hand shook, he had frequent vertigoes, and he would sometimes have fallen 
had he not supported himself by his cane under his coat. His nerves... were 
affected to such a degree, for a considerable time before his death... This disorder 
at last terminated in an apoplexy.” The debilitation of his body preceded the 
debilitation of his mind. As one went, so did the other. Richardson finally died of 
a stroke, “the outcome of his old paralytic disorder, which attacked him on 
Sunday, 28 June 1761.”  Pain dominated a great part of Richardson’s later years.  !44
In Clarissa, Richardson makes a particular effort to avoid using the word 
“pain” in a bodily sense; nearly ten percent of all instances of the word “pain” 
actually refer to a physical injury.  Scarry notices this phenomenon in almost all 45
artists when she comments, “even the artist—whose lifework and everyday habit 
are to refine and extend the reflexes of speech—ordinarily falls silent before 
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pain.”  Rarely do his characters truly hurt themselves; usually they complain of 46
gout or headaches, both indeed painful experiences but neither particularly 
unusual complaints and requiring elucidation.  Clarissa notes that her father 47
“had the gout upon him” , and Lord M complains to Mr. Belford of his “gouty 48
humours” (607). Mr. Lovelace explains to Goody Moore that he has a “dreadful 
pain in [his] jaws; an ague in them,” (738) but that was a lie to keep her from 
investigating his intended recapture of Clarissa. Generally characters must speak 
vaguely of their afflictions, for “gout” and “ague” are essentially metaphors for 
an unspecified type of pain assumed to be the same in everyone. “Ague” simply 
meant a fever, but Lovelace uses it to refer to his jaws. Lord M has the gout in his 
right hand, while Mr. Harlowe has it in his stomach. Pain in this novel slips from 
moniker to monkier, never specific in its mechanism but rather mediated by 
indistinct terms and circumlocution. Richardson adopts an Augustinian 
perspective on semiotics where words are simply signs, but they do refer to 
reality rather than to an abstract idea. !
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In order for this form of mediation to have any significance, words 
themselves must point to a reality; the signified must exist. If access to another’s 
pain must always be mediated by terminology, preconceptions, assumptions, and 
so forth, it needs a physical presence, or else it’s turtles all the way down.  This 49
is not to say that Derrida’s rein hors de texte and similar theories are invalid; they 
simply have no bearing on semiotics as Richardson uses it. Rather, one must 
assume an Augustinian perspective. In De Doctrina Christiana, Saint Augustine 
outlines his theory of language, one that posits a dual structure. There are signs 
and there are things; the sign is the word, and the thing is the object or idea to 
which the sign refers: !
All instructions are about things or signs: but things are learnt by 
means of signs. Now I use the word “thing” in a strict sense, to 
signify that which is never employed as a sign of anything else… 
There are signs of another kind, those which are never employed 
except as signs: for example, words. No one uses words except as 
signs of something else; and hence may be understood what I call 
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signs: those things, which are used to indicate something else. 
Accordingly, every sign is also a thing; for what is not a thing is 
nothing at all.  !50
A sign must refer to some thing, and the thing must exist outside the mind, or 
else God has created only an illusion for us and thus lies to us. For a devoted 
Christian such as Augustine, this conclusion is inconceivable, given the ultimate 
beneficence of his Creator. This assumes that language does not intend to present 
an idea to another but rather to ourselves. Contemporary critic Fr. William 
Ralston explains it in this manner: “The primary function of language is not to 
communicate, but to articulate.”  Communicative language (ideally) requires a 51
clear transference of an idea from one person to another. Language that 
articulates, on the other hand, takes a nebulous sense of something—anything—
and gives it form through sound. The intangible becomes tangible. Therefore, 
whenever Richardson refers to physical pain, this pain is a thing with a material 
existence for his characters—specifically one rooted in the nervous system of the 
character experiencing it—but this existence can only be accessed through 
medication. !
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More often Richardson uses “pain” as a noun to indicate someone’s 
emotional distress—like Clarissa’s determination to adhere to her moral compass
—or their strenuous efforts to accomplish something, usually to control Clarissa’s 
behavior. Just as “sympathy” transformed from a physical concurrence to a 
mental mirroring, so Richardson uses an originally physical reference, “pain," to 
describe an emotional distress. Scarry notes that “psychological suffering, though 
often difficult for any one person to express, does have referential content, is 
susceptible to verbal objectification, and is so habitually depicted in art that… 
there is virtually no piece of literature that is not about suffering, no piece of 
literature that does not stand by ready to assist us.”  Clarissa is a novel rife with 52
suffering and psychological pains, and Richardson uses “pain” in that way quite 
frequently.  For example, Clarissa’s brother commands that she travel “up or 
down the back stairs, that the sight of so perverse a young creature may not add 
to the pain you have given every body” (121). Clarissa’s father threatens her with 
“pain of displeasure” (57) should she refuse to marry Solmes. Pain, instead of 
being a physical attack on the nerves as the physicians theorize, is an attack on 
the mind, either dished out by some wretch or endured by the wretched. This 
type of psychological pain serves as both suffering and punishment, a whip 
lashed upon the emotions rather than the skin.  !
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Furthermore, “pain” could be used to indicate the effort someone takes to 
manifest their will in the world. For example, Clarissa explains the extent to 
which Lovelace has gone to mold her thoughts of him: “And though black seems 
to be his natural color, yet he has taken great pains to make me think him 
nothing but white” (461). He tries to possess Clarissa, but he also tries to slough 
off the blame onto others so that no one might be pained (offended or hurt) by 
his actions. Nearly all of Richardson’s characters take “pains” to control the 
situation and then experience emotional pain when said situation does not 
transpire as they will it. Pain, semantically, does not need to indicate an external 
condition under these circumstances because the emotions and the will remain 
sequestered in the mind. As Smith proposed, we can sympathize with the 
passions of another because we too can imagine and feel them, but we cannot 
sympathize with physical states because some mediator, be it our neurological 
constitution, linguistic imprecision, or failure to re-conceive past pains, prevents 
the mental correspondence required of it. Richardson constructs the world of 
Clarissa according to this principle, where the characters meant for admiration do 
not ask another to attempt to sympathize with physical pain. !
Clarissa alone appears unaffected by the “pain(s),” both of the body and 
the will, because she, more so than any other character, is the subject of the most 
mediation: three and sometimes four layers worth. Richardson mediates for 
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Clarissa, Clarissa’s sensations are mediated by the mechanisms of reality and the 
signs allotted to describe it, and then she mediates herself semantically and 
performatively in her letters. Often, Lovelace, Belford, or Anna Howe serve as 
another layer between Clarissa and her pains. When she experiences physical 
pain as Lovelace poisons her in order to rape her after she has passed out, 
Clarissa instead attributes the affliction to another emotion: “Ill before, I found 
myself still more and more disordered in my head; a heavy torpid pain 
increasing fast upon me. But I imputed it to my terror.” (1009). Even at the 
moment of her death, she expresses happiness rather than discomfort: “Oh! Mr. 
Belford, said she in broken periods; and with a faint inward voice, but very 
distinct nonetheless—Now!—Now!—(I bless God for His mercies to his poor 
creature) will all soon be over—A few—a very few moments—will end this strife
—and I shall be happy!” (1361). The broken and faint quality of her voice implies 
that Clarissa suffers from some physical malady, but she reveals nothing of it. 
Instead, as Smith suggests, Clarissa focuses on the terror rather than the pain; we 
have no access to her body. !
Belford and Lovelace frequently provide their own interpretation of 
Clarissa’s pains and of their own, though Richardson never suggests that they 
truly understand them. Haller’s experimental work on the body allowed for “the 
development of the sensible body or subject as an increasingly encoded and 
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decodable set of signs,”  but these signs are frequently misinterpreted or at least 53
unduly imposed upon Clarissa’s body. As Frances Ferguson suggests, “…if it 
then appears that Clarissa bespeaks the primacy of forms—a primacy designed to 
ensure the legibility of mental states by deriving them from forms—that very 
legibility itself carries within it the constant possibility of internal 
contradiction.”  In this case, the external form—the body—is meant to provide 54
the means to interpret that form’s interiority, but interpretation is and will always 
be imprecise. The body may act in ways contrary to the mind’s design, so 
Belford, Lovelace, and even the reader can never be certain how Clarissa feels 
from her form alone. Furthermore, Lovelace himself can barely distinguish his 
own mind from the yearnings of his body. As Ferguson says, “[Lovelace] has 
continually dispersed and recreated himself to acknowledge the absurdity of the 
connection between any particular form and any particular significance.”  For 55
instance, in the weeks preceding Clarissa's rape, Lovelace turns more and more 
violent as his frustration rises, and he forbids her from any personal freedoms, 
including letter-writing, strolls, or any other activity important to her. He became 
so infatuated with her that he cannot permit anything but that she be under his 
complete control. Yet, rake that he is, Lovelace cannot bear the thought of being 
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so consumed with one woman. In a monologue to his own conscience, Lovelace 
attempts to quell its altruistic passion using the language of violence and pain. 
He exclaims, “Take that, for a rising blow!— And now will thy pain, and my pain 
for thee, soon be over… Had I not given thee death's wound, thou wouldst have 
robbed me of all my joys… Gasp on!—That thy last gasp, surely!— How hard 
diest thou!” (848) If he can subjugate his conscience, he can subjugate Clarissa's 
moral principles without guilt. Pain here functions as the metaphorical conduit 
for further pain; a mental beating—Lovelace’s violent chastisement—produces 
the necessary apathy for a physical beating—Clarissa’s rape. Prior to the assault, 
Lovelace can only understand his world in terms of pain and pleasure, Locke's 
simple sensations upon which all more complex ones spring. Pleasure for 
Lovelace is sex with Clarissa, proving not only that he is such a stupendous rake 
that any woman will concede to his charms but also that every woman will 
eventually give in to her natural desire for sex. Pain for him is failure, indicating 
the falsity of his reputation and the torment of desiring a woman he can never 
have. This dichotomy he explains to Belford many times over after his 
kidnapping of Clarissa. Lovelace conflates violence with inner torment because 
he has never yet had to entertain more complex emotions in his dealings with the 
opposite sex. !
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Clarissa, on the other hand, does not associate another's violence with her 
pain because she believes the horrors that surround her stem from her own error, 
nor can she associate that pain with herself. Prior to her abduction, Clarissa has a 
frightening dream of her own violent death and careless burial. Yet, she describes 
it from an eerie third-person perspective: !
“Methought my brother, my uncle Anthony, and Mr Solmes had 
formed a plot to destroy Mr. Lovelace; who discovering it turned 
all his rage against me, believing I had a hand in it. I thought he 
made them all fly into foreign parts upon it; and afterwards 
seizing upon me, carried me into a churchyard; and there, stabbed 
me to the heart, and then tumbled me into a deep grave ready 
dug, among two or three half-dissolved carcasses; throwing in the 
dirt and earth upon me with his hands, and trampling it down 
with his feet. (342-43). !
Grammatically speaking, Clarissa forces herself to be the object of the violence 
rather than the subject-victim. Rather than saying, “I was tumbled into…,” she 
says, “[they] tumbled me.” Even here she mediates herself through the shift from 
subject to object. She describes it as though she were witnessing it and 
interpreting rather than experiencing this nightmare and suffering. In her own 
accounts of Lovelace’s violences preceding her rape, she only describes herself as 
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“unworthy,” “humbled,” and a “proud wretch” (890-892). In most cases, Clarissa 
steps outside herself and judges rather than sitting with her own mind and 
acknowledging her emotions and sensations. Yet, Belford sees exactly the 
opposite; for him, Clarissa's misery dissipates under the ultimate goodness of her 
soul. From his perspective, she simply dismisses wretched thoughts and feelings, 
for that is what moral paragons ought to do. When Clarissa begins to die after 
escaping Lovelace and his abuses, Belford observes, “She was stooping with 
pain… She then turned from me towards the window, with a dignity suitable to 
her words; and she showed her to be more of soul than of body at that instant. 
What magnanimity!” (1103). Without direct access to her interior, Belford must 
simply assume how she feels; from her posture, he assumes pain, and from her 
dignity, he assumes magnanimity. Stooping might well suggest muscle weakness 
without pain, but Belford wants to believe that Clarissa can overcome anything 
in her goodness, so he assumes the worst and praises her for failing to perform 
his assumption. As Goss explains, “Whether we turn to the body as an object that 
requires our attention, or as a sign of the subjects that we are, we turn to a 
substitutive figure that replaces particularity with the generality that allows us to 
name it. Such substitution replaces an absence of knowledge, an inability to 
know and name, with certainty.”  Belford cannot know; he can only guess. 56
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Similarly, however much the reader can imagine her passions and sympathize 
with her distresses, her physical form is simply a sensible shell for those 
emotions, a shell the reader cannot access. !
This utter impenetrability of Clarissa’s physical form reveals its 
irrelevance. Granted, this is not to say that Clarissa’s body has no role in the 
novel; first Lovelace and Mr. Solmes compete to see who ought to have legal 
possession of it through marriage, then Lovelace does everything in his power to 
force Clarissa to yield it up to him without marriage, and finally this body dies. 
However, the characters with the greatest interest in her body—Lovelace for its 
taunting virginity and Clarissa’s own family for her legal right to her 
grandfather’s lands—only consider it a vehicle for some other purpose or virtue. 
Goss theorizes that when excessive attention is paid to the body, it ceases to be a 
subject and becomes instead an object when she discusses William Hogarth’s The 
Reward of Cruelty: “… though in this final “Stage” his body will be the object 
rather than the subjective agent of a dismembering torture that exposes the body 
as merely a collection of parts…”  and thus Clarissa exists. She has become the 57
object of scrutiny, and thus her body is not her own. It is instead the object of the 
torturous intentions of her family and of Lovelace. The Harlowes simply hope to 
control their own reputation through Clarissa first through a terrible marriage 
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match to the vile Mr. Solmes and then by disowning her once Lovelace’s clever 
kidnapping threatens Clarissa’s chastity. Should Clarissa marry Mr. Solmes, he 
has agreed to assist her brother James in becoming “Lord Harlowe,” a title and 
nobility the family lusts after. Clarissa’s grandfather bequeathed to her all of his 
property, and Solmes, once her husband, could do with it as he pleased, 
including speeding the path to aristocracy for James Harlowe. Her body is 
simply a means to titular fame. Clarissa herself remarks upon the “envy, 
ambition, high and selfish resentment and all the violent passions” (234) of her 
family in an early letter to Anna Howe, and Anna responds with her typical 
sharp insight: !
One thing you must consider, that, if you leave your parents, your 
duty and love to them will not suffer you to appeal against them 
to justify yourself for so doing; and so you’ll have the world 
against you. And should Lovelace continue his wild life, and 
behave ungratefully to you, how will that justify their conduct to 
you (which nothing else can), as well as their resentments against 
him? (239)!
Anna recognizes the incredible virtue that Clarissa possesses, the virtue her 
family endeavors to command through Clarissa’s own moral sensibility, as well 
as the dangers inherent in Lovelace. Clarissa exists between the proverbial rock 
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and hard place for the first few hundred pages of the novel, her regard for her 
virtue and duty at war with her family’s desire for fame and power. !
Lovelace, meanwhile, has a purely incidental interest in her body; he 
focuses, rather, on the possibility for its corruption and therefore the corruption 
of Clarissa herself. Granted, he is indeed a rake with a well-established 
reputation for seducing women and sleeping with them. However, Clarissa does 
not represent another vagina to penetrate to Lovelace; she represents the ultimate 
conquest. If he manages to sleep with her, Lovelace proves that even the most 
virtuous of women will yield to their own natural lusts. If she resists him 
perpetually, then Lovelace will have found a woman worthy of his reformation. 
He too exists between that proverbial rock and hard place, for he desperately 
wants to claim her virtue and prove it false but desperately wants it intact as well 
so that he will feel righteous in marrying her. Sandra Macpherson, in arguing 
that Lovelace holds a sort of limited liability in Clarissa’s eventual death in 
Harm’s Way, asserts that “[Clarissa] is less a subject than a cause—because she 
accepts responsibility for a tragic plot that much as we might want to believe 
exceeds and is distinct from character, in fact, embodies it.”  This tragic plot is 58
Lovelace’s justification for his actions: a trial. He tells Belford that he is simply 
testing her as well as undertaking to rescue her humanity from her own 
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excessive and consequently false virtue: “What must virtue be which will not 
stand a trial? … Well then a trial seems necessary for the further establishment of 
the honor of so excellent a creature… if she overcome, that will redound to her 
honor… Am I not justified in my resolutions of trying her virtue, who is resolved, 
as I may say, to try mine?” (430-1). He further reveals his intentions many letters 
later: !
And should not my beloved, for her own sake, descend by degrees 
from goddesshood into humanity? If it be pride that restrains her, 
ought not that pride to be punished? If, as in the Eastern emperors, 
it be an art as well as pride, art is what she of all women need not 
use. If shame, what a shame to be ashamed to communicate to her 
adorer’s sight the most admirable of her personal graces? Let me 
perish, Belford, if I would not forgo the brightest diadem in the 
world for the pleasure of seeing a twin Lovelace at each charming 
breast, drawing from it his first sustenance; the pious task 
continued for one month, and no more! (706)!
If he can prove her virtue, he can obtain it for himself (through the metaphorical 
suckling at her breasts) and increase hers. If he can break her virtue down, he 
maintains his reputation as a rake and proves that all women shall fall if the best 
will. Belford, however, disbelieves Lovelace’s justification for not marrying his 
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captive just yet, and Belford is right: “If trial only was they end, as once was thy 
pretense, enough surely hast thou tried this paragon of virtue and vigilance. But I 
knew thee too well to expect, at the time, that thou wouldst stop there. Men of 
our cast, whenever they form a design upon any of the sex, put no other bound 
to the views than what want of power gives them” (714). Lovelace, he thinks, 
does not truly wish to prove Clarissa’s virtue and thus secure his own. He simply 
wants to overpower a paragon and thus reinforce his rakish prowess. The 
pleasures of her body have very little to do with his motivations; her body is the 
means by which he will enforce his power and desirability. !
Yet, many critics have theorized how and why Clarissa’s body dies with a 
satisfactory answer hardly to be found because her body has proven itself both 
inaccessible and uninterpretable. Richardson himself declared that Clarissa ought 
to die “for the sake of the example given by it,”  though precisely what example 59
Richardson intended remains open for argument. He simply refused to satisfy his 
readers with a happy ending to a plot that he believed could never go any way 
but tragically. Adam Budd argues that “Richardson’s representation of Clarissa’s 
death, whose organic causes he deliberately obscured, and thus whose inevitable 
basis he denied, indicated his eagerness to confront contemporary notions of 
literary sensibility by making it clear that the exemplary elements of Clarissa’s 
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character (rather than the character itself) ought to be emulated and not 
mourned.”  By killing off Clarissa, Richardson negates the suggestion that some 60
young girl might follow her path, for Clarissa’s path leads to rape and death. 
However, the circumstances of her death—her exemplary religious convictions 
and, more importantly, Belford’s subsequent reformation—elevate her as a moral 
paragon to be  imitated. Clarissa, Budd remarks, is a “sentimental heroine who 
lives to depict her own saintliness,” and naturally one must be dead to be 
considered for sainthood.  Budd considers Clarissa’s death to be Richardson’s 61
version of poetic justice: only if Clarissa died could Belford undergo a 
transformation, Lovelace be suitably punished for his presumptions, and Clarissa 
be released from her suffering. Kathryn Steele, meanwhile, focuses on Clarissa’s 
silence, citing a spiritual surrender as an explanation for her death: !
As we have already seen, Clarissa makes decisions in accordance 
with a prior surrender. Initially that surrender is to patriarchal 
authority: in her passive obedience to her father, she is willingly 
circumscribed by the tenets of filial obedience. Later, the surrender 
is to God; like silence, this act is difficult to perceive and describe 
in material terms… Clarissa attempts to transcend immediate 
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understanding by earthly readers, and… she moves their 
judgment out of the realm of the material world. !62
Namely, Clarissa uses her quiet passivity to exemplify the proper relationship 
between man and God: one of silent surrender. Raymond Stephenson suggests 
that “Clarissa dies because of her nervous sensibility,” denying any ulterior 
message to her death; she simply dies of a bodily weakness.  Each of these 63
explanations—and many more left un-cited—focus on Clarissa as a character 
with a body that can either speak, be silent, represent, or exemplify. These 
theorists assume a weaker distinction between the body and mind, a point of 
contention that pervaded eighteenth century neuroscience and natural 
philosophy.!
The explanation that accords most closely with theories of pain and 
anatomy comes from Ferguson, who acknowledges the inaccessibility of 
Clarissa’s body: “Clarissa makes her body, the body that Lovelace had hoped to 
convert into a form of consent, into a slowly wasting sign of the inability of a 
form to carry mental states in anything but excessively capacious (that is, 
ambiguous) or potentially self-contradictory stipulated forms.” She separates the 
mind and the body as distinctively as the eighteenth century physicians do, for 
any hints the body could provide for subjectivity are completely unreliable. 
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Ferguson continues, “…from the moment after the rape, when Clarissa begins 
dying and Lovelace begins longing for her consent, the novel is literally haunted 
by the specter of psychology, in which mental states do not so much appear as 
register the improbability of their appearing.”  The body carries within it the 64
mind/soul, but it remains the messenger for mentality rather than the 
manifestation of it. Terry Castle supports the perspective of the body as an 
unreliable means of communication. Her dying, she says, becomes “a methodical 
self-expulsion from the realm of signification.”  In this version, Clarissa refuses 65
to be an object of interpretation for everyone else’s subjective approaches, as they 
often get it wrong. One’s own body can at most mediate but not display in their 
entirety the expressions of the mind though gesture and language. !
! Richardson mimics the nature of sympathy when he denies us direct 
access to Clarissa’s mind but rather casts Anna as the medium through which the 
reader encounters Clarissa’s heart, Lovelace the medium for her abuse, and 
Belford the medium for her death. For instance, Belford is our translator, our 
aether, keeping the reader two steps removed from Clarissa’s experience: first 
through his subjective experience of her, and second through the reader’s of him. 
He can interpret her language, gestures, and convulsions, but he too is not 
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entirely accessible, being of a separate entity than the reader and thus whose 
reality cannot intersect with ours. Ultimately, the novel itself has same epistemic 
problems as sympathy itself: both operate on the imagination alone. The 
eighteenth century turn toward sentimental novels parallels the neurological and 
sentimental theories exemplified by Hartley and Smith, as sympathetic pain lies 
in the passions, not the body, and thus can only be understood through 
imaginative recreation. Authors like Richardson turned their focus inward as 
physicians deemed the unmediated gaze outward categorically impossible. The 
etymology of sympathy, συ&'άθεια, translates literally to "suffering with," and 
eighteenth century science and philosophy dictates that one cannot suffer 
another's physical pain. Therefore, Clarissa represents the sympathetic 
epistemology where the characters' passions inspire passions but their pain 
remains their own. !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Conclusion!
Both neuroscience and natural philosophy have progressed greatly since 
the eighteenth century, discovering impressive connections between the 
operations of the consciousness and the operations of the body that Hunter, 
Haller, Hartley, and the rest never imagined.  However, their natures remain 
distinct in contemporary theory and science, as Kim explains thoroughly in Mind 
in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation and 
Kramnick suggests in Actions and Objects from Hobbes to Richardson, both of which 
I referenced earlier. They certainly may affect one another, superimpose upon the 
other, and so forth, but the consciousness is in itself a different type of thing than 
the physical form. Whether this separation solidified from developments in 
neuroscience in the eighteenth century or at another time is not a matter of 
immediate concern, but the theories outlined by Hunter, von Haller, Bonnet, 
Hartley, and so forth outline mechanistic rather than metaphysical operations. 
Where once Descartes’ theories relied upon animal spirits to convey sensations 
from the body to the brain, his successors described mechanisms such as 
compressions, fluids, and moving particles. Subsequently, the brain must 
interpret the signals arriving from the source of the stimuli and then send a 
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message back, whether instinctive or deliberative, i.e. with the intervention of the 
consciousness. Yet, if one’s own mind and body interpret each other, separate 
bodies and separate minds have an even larger separation requiring greater 
inference. !
Physical pain remains the most revealing human experience that exhibits 
the distinction between minds and bodies most thoroughly. Pain belongs only to 
the person who experiences it, and pain requires a form in order to be 
experienced. The mind can only reflect on the terrible throbbing of a headache, 
and the sufferer’s companion must take the sufferer’s word that his head hurts 
(as the companion can hardly share the headache with the afflicted.) Thus, pain is 
endlessly mediated, first through the form, then through consciousness, then 
figurative language, then to another form, and finally to another consciousness, 
and such is the simplest path for knowledge of another’s pain to travel. At 
minimum, the knowledge of pain is mediated five times and as such requires 
interpretation. As Scarry explains, the crux of the problem lies in the figurative 
language required to communicate pain, as pain itself resists objectification in 
language and must instead rely on metaphor and circumlocution. Emotions such 
as joy or sadness, though differing often in cause, do not differ in manifestation. 
Therefore, should Clarissa claim herself to be sad, Anna would understand and 
sympathize with Clarissa’s feeling of sadness. However, should Clarissa claim a 
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headache, Anna could ask, “Is it sharp, dull, throbbing, stabbing, aching, 
crushing, shooting, burning, or pressing?” If Clarissa were to reply with 
“throbbing,” not only would “throbbing” need to be the most accurate metaphor 
to describe the type of pain in her head, but also Anna would have to understand 
both what “throbbing” implies with regards to pain but also to have experienced 
a “throbbing” headache herself. Even if this were the case, Anna still must make 
a comparison that by nature can only approximate Clarissa’s experience, never 
mirror it. According to Smith, sympathy requires a mirroring of one person’s 
circumstance within the mind or memory of another. Note that sympathy need 
only mirror in type, though not necessarily in intensity. Anna and Belford may 
sympathize with each other’s grief over Clarissa’s misfortune and death even if 
one grieves slightly more than the other. Yet, no one can sympathize with the 
wretched Mrs. Sinclair’s broken femur because no one has felt the pain of a 
femur snapped in exactly the same manner as she snapped hers under the same 
circumstances, nor can she express that sensation adequately enough for another 
to learn. !
Richardson understood well the inaccessibility of another’s pain, suffering 
greatly himself near the end of his life, as well as the distressing passions that 
drive people’s efforts to control others, and he emphasized both in Clarissa. 
Richardson assiduously disallows his characters to express real physical pain 
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directly, assisted by the epistolary form of the novel. All pains are recounted in 
reflection and in consciously chosen language rather than instinctual and non-
linguistic outbursts. However, Richardson frequently uses every linguistic 
variation of the word “pain” to emphasize emotional and motivational distress 
rather than bodily harm.  Often someone takes great pains to accomplish 
something, or another has caused great pain to that person’s heart. Rarely does 
anyone expressly complain of a physical malady. !
Clarissa in particular refuses to say that she experiences any discomfort 
even when the situation suggests she ought, emphasizing the unimportance of 
physical substance to her being. Although Richardson’s characters undergo all 
sorts of pains, physical and cognitive, noun and verb, the only ones directly 
accessible to the reader are the pains of the mind; all that is known of the body 
comes mediated several times over by the epistles, semantics, and Richardson 
himself. Clarissa’s body functions as a means to others’ goals: a secure estate and 
title for the Harlowes, reputation for Solmes, proof of women’s sexuality and 
lack of steadfast virtue for Lovelace, and proof of ultimate virtue for most 
everyone else. Her body is simply an object of interpretation, a means to 
understand her mental and spiritual condition, and not a reliable one. If 
Clarissa’s body told the unadulterated truth, the reader would know its pains 
and the cause of its death. Instead, her pains are inaccessible and her death a 
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mystery. Sympathy with her physical condition is impossible; her body is 
irrelevant in its inaccessibility. !
Clarissa instructs its readers in the ultimate reality of subjectivity. Though 
novels of the period were transitioning from descriptions of a character’s actions 
and adventures to their subjective interpretations of the events that befall them, 
Richardson’s Clarissa presents subjectivity as an outsider experiences it. The 
epistolary form demands mediation in every instance because letters are written 
in reflection rather than in the moment. Thus Richardson creates unstable 
sympathies in his characters and readers, as the endless mediation makes an 
accurate representation of pain nearly impossible. The separation between the 
mind and body as theorized by his contemporaries and the nature of sympathy 
as articulated by Smith dictate the subjectivity Richardson could depict in his 
penultimate novel. !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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